2009__03 -- BECKER.DOC

12/30/2008 4:54:00 PM

KSR v. TELEFLEX: HOW
“OBVIOUSNESS” HAS CHANGED
DANIEL BECKER*

A patent is invalid on obviousness grounds when the “differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
1
in the art to which the subject matter pertains.” In KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme Court unanimously
held that a court may find a patent invalid as obvious3 absent a
specific finding that some “teaching, suggestion, or motivation”
(TSM) existed that would direct an inventor to combine elements of
prior art in the same way as the patentee did in the challenged
4
patent. The Court held that the proper inquiry focuses on the
objective reach of the claim, not the “particular motivation nor the
avowed purpose of the patentee.”5 Despite past criticism for
disregarding Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the proper test
6
for obviousness, the Federal Circuit seems to have followed the
direction provided in KSR v. Teleflex in the months after the decision
was handed down on April 30, 2007. Indeed, comparing the Federal
Circuit’s opinion7 from which KSR v. Teleflex arose with the court’s
opinions soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex
reveals that the Federal Circuit is in fact applying its “TSM” test much
more broadly, making it easier for an infringement defendant to
invalidate a patent based on obviousness.

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. 35 U.S.C. §103(a).
2. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004).
4. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
5. Id. at 1741, 1742.
6. Brief for Petitioner at 30, KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No.
04-1350), 2006 WL 2515631 (“commentators describe the Federal Circuit as having ‘neatly
abolished,’ ‘ignored,’ and ‘dismiss[ed]’ Supreme Court precedent”).
7. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

2009__03 -- BECKER.DOC

46

12/30/2008 4:54:00 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 4:45

I. Background of the Case
8
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. began in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan as a patent
9
infringement suit between two automobile-parts manufacturers. At
the time of the original suit, Teleflex was the exclusive licensee of the
“Engelgau” patent,10 which disclosed a particular type of adjustable
11
pedal assembly used in automobiles. Because the key issue in this
case was whether the Engelgau patent represented an obvious
combination of prior art, a brief discussion of prior art in the field is
necessary.
A. The Prior Art
In its most basic form, the gas pedal of an automobile can be
depressed or released to control the rate at which gasoline and air
enter the engine, but its resting location in the footwell cannot be
adjusted.12 This limitation created problems for small drivers who
13
owned cars with deep footwells. In the 1970s, inventors began to
develop pedal assemblies with pedals that could be adjusted within
the footwell.14 Two such designs are important in this case. The
15
“Asano” patent discloses “a support structure that houses the pedal
so that even when the pedal location is adjusted relative to the driver,
one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed.”16 The Asano pedal
assembly also is designed so that no matter where the pedal sits
17
within the footwell, the force required to depress it remains constant.
18
The “Redding” patent discloses an adjustable pedal assembly in
which the pedals and their pivot points move when the driver adjusts
19
the pedal position within the footwell.
The gas pedal of an automobile—whether adjustable or not—can
interact with the throttle in one of two ways: either by a mechanical

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
U.S. Patent No. 6,109,241 (filed January 26, 1999).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1727, 1737.
Id. at 1735.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Patent No. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1999).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735.
Id.
U.S. Patent No. 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735.
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link such as a cable or by a computer that detects the gas pedal’s
position and transmits that data to the throttle.20 In the 1990s, more
cars were being equipped with computer-controlled throttles, and it
21
became necessary to design compatible pedal assemblies. Several
pedal-assembly designs were patented in the early 1990s that
integrated electronic sensors to detect the pedal’s position and
22
transmit the data to a computer-controlled throttle. For example,
U.S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (the ’936 patent)23 revealed an assembly with
an electronic position sensor located in the pedal assembly itself,
24
25
rather than in the engine. Another patent—the “Smith” patent —
taught that the electronic sensor should be mounted in a fixed
location, rather than in the footpad, to prevent the wires connecting it
to the engine from damage caused by the driver’s foot and chafing
because of movement.26 Additionally, U.S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (the
’068 patent)27 provided an entirely different solution to the electronicsensor problem. The ’068 patent revealed a self-contained “modular”
electronic sensor that could be taken off the shelf and attached to a
mechanical pedal assembly, making that assembly compatible with a
28
computer-controlled throttle.
Not surprisingly, by 1995 at least one patent existed that
integrated electronic position sensors and an adjustable pedal
29
assembly. The “Rixon” patent revealed an adjustable pedal assembly
with an electronic sensor mounted in the footpad of each pedal.30 The
wires connecting the electronic sensors to the computer-controlled
throttle in this design, however, were known to chafe as a result of the
pedal arm’s constant movement.31

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (filed Sept. 9, 1991).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735.
U.S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (filed July 9, 1990).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736.
U.S. Patent No. 5,385,068 (filed Dec. 18, 1992).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736.
U.S. Patent No. 5,819,593 (filed Aug. 17, 1995)
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1736.
Id.
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B. The Engelgau Patent32
Teleflex held the exclusive license to the Engelgau patent at the
33
time this action was commenced. Claim four of the Engelgau patent
disclosed “a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic
pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal
assembly,” which “allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position
while the driver adjusts the pedal.”34 The specification of the Engelgau
patent reveals that it was intended to be a “simplified vehicle control
pedal assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and
is easier to package within the vehicle.”35
C. The Controversy
KSR was hired by General Motors Corporation (GMC) in 2000 to
“supply adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks
that used engines with computer-controlled throttles.”36 To meet
GMC’s needs, KSR simply added a modular electronic sensor to an
adjustable pedal assembly that it previously had been supplying to
Ford for use in automobiles with mechanical throttles.37 Teleflex
notified KSR that it believed “‘any supplier of a product that
combines an adjustable pedal with an electronic throttle control
necessarily employs technology covered by one or more’ of Teleflex’s
38
patents.” After KSR refused to enter into a royalty agreement with
Teleflex, Teleflex sued for infringement of the Engelgau patent.39 KSR
moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Engelgau patent was
invalid because “it would have been obvious to someone with
ordinary skill in the art of designing pedal systems to combine an
adjustable pedal system with an electronic pedal position sensor to
work with electronically controlled engines increasingly being used in
motor vehicles.”40

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

U.S. Patent No. 6,109,241 (filed January 26, 1999).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Id. (quoting Teleflex v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585 (E.D. Mich. 2003)).
Id.
Teleflex v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION
41

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of KSR.
The court began its analysis with the four-part inquiry first articulated
42
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, which states that
whether an invention is obvious is a question of law based on an
examination of “(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
level of ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the prior
art and the claimed invention; and (4) the extent of any objective
43
indicia of non-obviousness.”
The district court found that the Asano patent revealed relevant
prior art and that it taught each of the limitations in claim four of the
Engelgau patent except “those relating to an electronic pedal position
44
sensor.” The court also noted that prior art such as the ’068 patent
disclosed electronic position sensors, similar to the one used in claim
45
four of the Engelgau patent. All parties agreed that a person having
ordinary skill in the art would have an undergraduate mechanical
engineering degree, or the equivalent amount of industry experience,
and familiarity with various types of pedal control systems.46
The district court observed that:
[t]he fact that Asano and the modular pedal position sensors teach
the invention disclosed in claim 4 does not render their
combination obvious, however, unless there is ’some motivation or
suggestion to combine the prior art teachings,’ either in the prior
art itself, or by reasonable inference from the nature of the
problem, or from the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the
47
art.

The district court found such a “suggestion” in the Rixon patent.
The pedal assembly disclosed by the Rixon patent included an

41. Id.
42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
43. Teleflex. v. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
44. Id. at 592.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 590.
47. Id. at 593 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding that “the suggestion to combine requirement stands as a critical safeguard against
hindsight analysis and rote application of the legal test for obviousness”); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc.
v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (determining that “[o]bviousness
cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed
invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination”)).
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electronic position sensor mounted in the pedal arm, and the frequent
motion of the pedal arm was known to cause chafing of the wires that
connected the electronic sensor to the internal computer.48 The district
court concluded that it would have been obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to mount the modular electronic position
sensor disclosed in ’068 on the fixed pivot section of the Asano pedal
assembly in order to avoid the chafing problems associated with the
Rixon design.49 Based on this conclusion, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of KSR, and Teleflex appealed to the
50
Federal Circuit.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON APPEAL
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.51 The court observed that “the best defense against the
subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness
analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the
teaching or motivation to combine prior art references.”52 Proceeding
on this premise, the court held that the district court erred because it
53
had “applied an incomplete teaching-suggestion-motivation test.”
More specifically, the court held that the district court had not
articulated “finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle
within the knowledge of a skilled artisan” that would have led
someone to combine the teachings of ’068 and Asano in the way that
Engelgau had.54
The Federal Circuit further held that the suggestion or motivation
was not implied by the nature of the prior art in this case, as the
district court had found it was, because the prior art that the Engelgau
55
patent combined was not designed to address the same problem.
Specifically, the purpose of the Engelgau patent “was to design a
56
smaller, less complex, and less expensive electronic pedal assembly.”
The Asano patent, in contrast, was designed to address the constant-

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 594.
Id.
Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x 282, 283 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ratio problem,57 and the Rixon patent was not designed to address the
problem of wire chafing, but rather suffered from it.58 The court held
that although the Smith patent taught that the wires attached to the
electronic position sensor must not move with the pedal, this “does
not necessarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic
control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly,” and in any
case, “the Smith patent does not relate to adjustable pedal
assemblies.”59
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that an invention cannot be
proven obvious merely by showing that the particular combination of
prior art embodied by the invention might have been “obvious to
60
try.” Rather, the court held, a finding of obviousness must be
supported by a specific finding that an inventor with no knowledge of
the invention in question would have been motivated to combine the
prior art in exactly the same manner as the invention.61
In sum, the Federal Circuit affirmed its long-standing, self-created
TSM standard, which, in its view, “requires a court to make specific
findings showing a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed.”62 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari63 to address the question “whether the
Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed invention cannot
be held ‘obvious,’ and thus unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in
the absence of some proven ‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ that
would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the
relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.”64
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Federal Circuit, holding that by applying the TSM test in such a strict

57. The constant-ratio problem refers to the problem of designing a pedal assembly such
that the force necessary to depress each pedal remains constant regardless of the pedal’s resting
position within the footwell. Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x at 288.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 288–89.
60. Id. at 290 (“’Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute obviousness.”)
(quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
61. Id. at 289.
62. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)
(No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463.
64. Id.
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manner, the Federal Circuit had “analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid
manner inconsistent with [35 U.S.C.] § 103 and our precedents.”65 The
Court pointed out three errors of law made by the Federal Circuit,
66
and articulated the correct standard for each.
First, the Court concluded that a patent can be invalid for
obviousness if “there existed at the time of invention a known
problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the
67
patent’s claims.” The Federal Circuit erred by limiting this inquiry
“only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve.”68 The correct
standard, the Court held, is that a patent may be obvious if its subject
matter represents the obvious solution to any problem known within
the field, regardless of whether it was the problem the patentee was
69
aiming to solve. In this case, although the Engelgau patent was
aimed at providing a simpler, less expensive pedal assembly,70 it
nonetheless represented the obvious solution to a well-known
problem: integrating an electronic position sensor and an adjustable
pedal assembly in such a way as to avoid wire chafing problems.71
Second, the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that an inventor
aiming to solve a problem “will be led only to those elements of prior
72
art designed to solve the same problem.” This holding repudiated the
Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the requisite “teaching, suggestion,
or motivation” could not be implied by the nature of the problem in
this case because the prior art was designed to address different
problems than Engelgau.73 The fact that Asano was designed to solve
the constant-ratio problem, the Court said, had little relevance
because another of its key features was a fixed pivot point—precisely
where other prior art such as the Smith and Rixon patents had taught
74
was an ideal mount for an electronic position sensor. The Court
observed that “[t]he idea that a designer hoping to make an
adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was
designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little sense. A

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746.
Id. at 1742.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1744–45.
Id. at 1742.
Teleflex v. KSR, 119 F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
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person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.”75
Finally, the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that proof that a
particular combination would have been “obvious to try” is never
76
sufficient to establish obviousness. To the contrary, the Court noted
that in an industry faced with a problem for which there are “a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions,” a person attempting to
solve that problem will likely first try “the known options within his
or her technical grasp.”77 If a solution is found this way, the Court
observed, “it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary
skill and common sense,” and thus may be found obvious despite
merely being “obvious to try.”78
This three-pronged repudiation of the Federal Circuit’s strict
application of the TSM test certainly appeared to be a turning point
for the concept of obviousness.79 However, the Federal Circuit has a
80
history of disregarding Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
Thus, immediately following the Court’s opinion there was
uncertainty regarding whether and how the Federal Circuit would
follow it.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SINCE KSR V. TELEFLEX
In the first five months after the decision, it became clear that the
Federal Circuit had indeed changed its approach to the obviousness
inquiry. As one expert noted, “[t]he KSR Supreme Court decision has
completely revamped the Federal Circuit’s thinking on
nonobviousness.”81 Another expert predicted that the decision would
affect the types of patents that are challenged and the outcome of
those challenges, especially in the pharmaceutical industry:
I believe that you will see generic pharmaceutical companies be
more aggressive in challenging the validity of patents owned by

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Commentary of Michael Barclay, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, as posted by
Gretchen Sund to SCOTUSblog.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/some-thoughts-about-ksrv-teleflex-the-marketplace-test-for-obviousness (Apr. 30, 2007) (“This decision makes it far
easier to invalidate patents based on obviousness.”).
80. See supra note 6.
81. E-mail from Maxim H. Waldbaum, Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP, to Daniel W.J. Becker
(Sept. 17, 2007, 14:51 EST) (on file with author).
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brand pharmaceutical companies, especially those patents relating
to extended-release formulations or certain methods of use. With
many extended-release formulations, there is typically a finite
number of ways to achieve the extended-release of the active
ingredient, and there is almost always market pressure to develop
a drug formulation that can be taken once or twice a day, as
opposed to every few hours. Under those circumstances, it would
likely be obvious to try the known methods to achieve extendedrelease, and the results would often be predictable. When that is
the case, KSR would suggest that a patent on the extended-release
82
formulation would be invalid for obviousness.

Indeed, roughly ten days after the Supreme Court handed down
KSR v. Teleflex, the Federal Circuit held that a patent owned by
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. (“Leapfrog”), a manufacturer of children’s
toys, was invalid as obvious.83 Leapfrog owned a patent (the ’861
patent)84 for an electronic learning device whereby a child could press
a button or switch associated with a letter, and the speakers within the
85
device would emit the sound associated with that letter. Leapfrog
sued Fisher-Price, Inc., alleging that their “PowerTouch” device
infringed the ’861 patent.86 The Federal Circuit upheld the decision of
the district court, finding that Leapfrog’s patent was invalid as
obvious because it simply took one element of prior art—a
mechanical version of the device87—and upgraded it with modern
electronics, which the court found to be “commonly available and
88
understood in the art.”
Not once in the opinion did the Federal Circuit revert to its
89
recently-repudiated TSM test. Rather, the court sang a decidedly
different tune when addressing the issue of obviousness: “An
obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula
dissociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the
common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some

82. E-mail from Chad A. Landmon, Partner, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, to Daniel
W.J. Becker (Sept. 27, 2007, 17:07 EST) (on file with author).
83. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed Cir. 2007).
84. U.S. Patent No. 5,813,861 (filed June 20, 1997).
85. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1158.
86. Id.
87. U.S. Patent No. 3,748,748 (filed Dec. 1, 1971) (the “Bevan” device).
88. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162.
89. See generally Leapfrog, 485 F.3d 1157.
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combinations would have been obvious where others would not.”90
The Federal Circuit applied the approach outlined in KSR in at least
eight other cases between May 2007 and October 2007.91
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears clear that KSR v. Teleflex represents a dramatic change
in the concept of obviousness, although the magnitude of this change,
in large part, remains to be seen. One expert has predicted that many
changes will occur within the Patent and Trademark Office, with more
patents being denied on initial examination or invalidated upon
reexamination.92 Whether this prophecy will prove accurate in the
long run, however, is not immediately clear. Perhaps the practical
impact of KSR v. Teleflex is best described by another expert, who
stated that “a patentee can no longer count on the Federal Circuit for
any support on both issues of validity and infringement . . . . [W]e are
back to 1982, with the stakes much higher and the nonuniformity, fear
level, and security factor for all parties embarrassingly undefined.”93

90. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1161 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739
(2007) (emphasis added).
91. See Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007); PharmaStem Therapeutics,
Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Omegaflex, Inc. v. Parker-Hannafin Corp.,
243 F. App’x 592 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Trans Tex.
Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Metropolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494
F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto, Co., 231 F. App’x. 954 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
92. See Jay Sandvos, Bromberg & Sunstein LLP, Expert Analysis: How KSR v. Teleflex
Should Change Your Patent Strategies, ELECTRONICS DESIGN, STRATEGY, NEWS, May 16, 2007,
http://www.edn.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleid=CA6442383.
93. Waldbaum, supra note 81.

